What happens to earnings upon marriage? Linking administrative and survey data from Germany, we show that there is a marriage earnings gap. Even after accounting for the child penalty, women’s earnings drop by 20% after marriage. We show that the marriage earnings gap results from both the extensive margin (women stop working) and the intensive margin (women work fewer hours), but not from a decrease in hourly wages. Labor supply disincentives from joint taxation can explain about one quarter of the marriage earnings gap, while we find no effect for labor supply incentives from changes in divorce law. Leveraging variation in norms created by the German separation, we find that gender norms are another important driver behind the marriage earnings gap.

This paper examines monthly earnings volatility and its transmission to household earnings volatility using Norwegian data on the universe of monthly pay histories. We document substantial month-to-month earnings changes: within a job, while over one-quarter of months have no earnings changes, another quarter have at least a 23% change. Accounting for multiple jobs and non-employment increases volatility, while aggregating to households reduces volatility by 12-35%. Event studies around job loss and couple formation, along with decomposition and bounding exercises, show that most of this decline reflects pooling effects rather than sorting or responses to shocks.

Default settings strongly increase pension enrollment, especially when savings incentives are high and choices are complex. We show that the effect is weaker when incentives are low, options are simple, and opting out is easy. We study the nationwide introduction of auto-enrollment for low-income employees in Germany's public pay-as-you-go pension system. We find that automatic enrollment raises participation by 23 percentage points, though most individuals actively opt out. Linking administrative and survey data shows that the default effect is stronger when enrollment incentives are higher and among individuals who lack knowledge of their enrollment status. 

Taxpayers can reduce their tax liability by itemizing deductions and claiming more than the standard deduction they are automatically entitled to. I show that taxpayers also itemize when this does not reduce their tax liability. This is a mistake because itemizing has costs but no benefits and is thus strictly dominated by not itemizing. Using German administrative income tax data, I document that 57 percent of tax filers make this mistake at least once. They itemize even when the sum does not exceed the standard deduction, or when they already face a zero tax liability before itemizing, or both.